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In recent years numerous archaeological approaches to pre- 
dictive modeling have been presented in the literature. Most 
of these have taken the "inductive" perspective of applying 
known site locations to an analysis that estimates probable 
site location based on a mathematical equation and presents 
predictive surfaces in a GIS. Conversely, "deductive" models 
have also been used in which "expert systems" or site selec- 
tion variables have been quantified as probability surfaces. 
There has been little discussion, though, of the differences 
between CRM and academic-based predictive modeling and 
how it has influenced the state of the "science" today. 
Generating more refined inductive predictive models either 
through the use of higher quality site location data or 
through more complex statistical techniques, runs counter to 
the implicit goals of CRM-based predictive modeling. A sim- 
ple deductive GIS approach which assumes a causal expla- 
natory relationship creates comparable or better results 
(especially in homogenous areas) with no negative effects on 
these limited goals. Ultimately, the dichotomy between 
inductive and deductive approaches is not in theoretical 
orientation, rather it is embodied in our understanding (or 
failure to understand) that predictive modeling is really a tool 
useful only for land management, not interpretive archaeo- 
logy. 
The primary use of predictive models to date is almost inva- 
riably for large scale Cultural Resource Management (CRM) 
applications, and they typically occur in North America. The 
second primary purpose for which predictive models have 
been developed is that of understanding past land use or what 
can be called site selection processes (Whitley 2000). It was 
recognized early on that predictive models provided a quan- 
titative aspect to what was well understood as the qualitative 
realm of settlement pattern analysis (e.g. Allen et al. 1990). 
Clearly, predictive modeling is seen as a means by which we 
might address some of the complex issues of human/landsca- 
pe interaction, typically in a GIS framework. 
Though Bayesian statistics is not invoked in all predictive 
models, the underiying structure of Bayesian probability is 
assumed for all of them. The first fully articulated assumption 
of all archaeological predictive modeling is a form of the 
Bayesian rule of "total probability" (Peari 2000:3). This 
assumption can be stated as: The probability of any land unit 
being a site (or a portion of a site) is the sum of the probabi- 
lities of all exhaustive and mutually exclusive variables that 
cause a land unit to be chosen as a site or to unintentionally 
be made one. Put simply, this means that the presence of a 
site in any area is a factor of all possible influencing variables 
(intentional or unintentional). This invokes a direct causal 
relationship between archaeological sites and a host of possi- 
ble variables; the underlying principle of all predictive 
models. This is further elaborated by the "conditional rule of 
Bayesian probability" (Pearl 2000:3-4). This can be stated in 
archaeological terms as: The probability of any land unit 
being a site is the sum of the probabilities of each causal vari- 
able multiplied by the conditional probability ofthat variable. 
Put simply again, this means that not every factor is as 
influential as every other factor; that they each respond to 
other conditions, or in effect provide an individual weight to 
the final probability of any land unit being part of an archae- 
ological site. The diversity in influence of different variables 
allows predictive modelers to statistically assess, or make 
expert decisions about, what they find to be the most influen- 
tial factors and build their models accordingly. 
So, what are the theoretical implications of the foregoing cha- 
racterizations? The most obvious is that the site must be a 
valid and useful concept to explain human activity. Also, that 
sites are definitive and absolute in their ability to be identi- 
fied, and that the characteristics used to identify sites are 
strictly correlative with human behavior, and not other phe- 
nomena. That correlation is assumed to mean that the most 
common or abundant behavior(s) are the most significant 
with respect to the purposes of predictive modeling, and that 
the success of predictive models is a factor of their ability to 
identify the most common site-selection behaviors. 
Are these implications necessarily true, though, and what is 
not implied by these assumptions, but may be true? First of 
all, sites may not be easily distinguished by empirical evi- 
dence, and they may not be considered strictly representative 
of human activity (Dunnell 1992). Different activities result 
in different kinds of sites, and different kinds of sites may 
have many different kinds of manifestations. Strictly spea- 
king, significance of archaeological sites cannot be equated 
with abundance, and models geared toward identifying the 
most common elements of site selection may, in fact, over- 
look very significant sites in supposedly low potential zones. 
This becomes manifested in the distinction between so-called 
inductive and deductive models. 
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Interestingly, archaeologists employ the terms inductive and 
deductive in ways that are quite limited with respect to their 
meaning in the realm of scientific explanation. In philosophy 
of science, the terms inductive and deductive refer to the dif- 
ference between logical arguments based on universal laws 
and statistical tendencies. Deductive explanations are based 
on mathematically consistent and provable laws, while induc- 
tive ones are based on observing statistical trends (Hempel 
1965, Salmon 1998). In archaeological predictive modeling, 
however, inductive and deductive do not refer to methods of 
explanation, rather to practical means by which probability 
values are calculated. In the end, all predictive models are 
trend-based, or inductively explanatory; even so-called deduc- 
tive ones. Instead, the distinction should be made between 
models as being either correlative or cognitive in nature. 
Correlative models are those which use existing site data and 
currently measurable enviroimiental variables to build stati- 
stical relationships which can then be generalized from pre- 
viously surveyed areas to those which have not been survey- 
ed (such as through regression analysis). As such, correlative 
models are strictly empirical by nature and make the assump- 
tions of determinism. Deterministic explanation comes in 
several forms (Hempel 1965 Salmon 1998) but in general the 
Bayesian rule of conditional probability, in a deterministic 
framework, would embrace the idea that the inaccuracies of 
any predictive model are the result of not having enough 
information. All probabilities could be identified, in princi- 
ple, if we only had the ability to do so. 
Cognitive models are those which are not limited by existing 
archaeological data. Hypotheses of site placement are built 
on understanding more complex issues involved in the cog- 
nitive selection of suitable areas. Then, presumed important 
variables are measured and classified in a way hypothetical- 
ly similar to how prehistoric populations may have done so, 
and probability surfaces are projected across the entire lands- 
cape. A single cognitive model may, in fact, produce many 
different permutations which can be tested. Once complete, 
the known dataset of archaeological sites is then compared to 
the projected probability zones and accuracy and precision 
estimates are made. Cognitive models are not necessarily 
deterministic, though they can be. But they do have the 
potential to embrace indeterminism, since they are not built 
from correlative evaluations. 
A good way to understand the difference between determini- 
stic and indeterministic explanation can be illustrated by this 
example (adapted from Mackie 1974:40-41 and Salmon 
1998:145-147). Imagine three candy machines. The first is 
purely deterministic; if you put in a Euro, a candy bar is 
always ejected. No other coin or object will cause the candy 
bar to be released, and no candy bar will ever be inadvertent- 
ly released without the insertion of a Euro. We know that the 
function of inserting a Euro is both necessary and sufficient 
to cause a candy bar to be ejected. We can therefore deducti- 
vely explain the presence of a candy bar with the determini- 
stic rule that a Euro must have been inserted. 
A second machine, though, is somewhat different. With it the 
insertion of a Euro will always produce a candy bar, but 
sometimes insertion of other items will have the same effect. 
Thus, a Euro is a sufficient cause of the presence of a candy 
bar, but it is not the only possible (or necessary) cause. The 
presence of a candy bar, therefore cannot be deductively 
explained by a rule stating a Euro must have been inserted, 
rather it becomes an issue of inductive probability. There is a 
certain likelihood that a Euro may have caused the appearan- 
ce of the candy bar (which can be calculated by assessing the 
state of the system over a period of time or a set number of 
observations). The machine is still deterministic, though, 
because we assume that if complete information were availa- 
ble, we could always explain the presence of a candy bar. 
A third machine differs in that inserting a Euro or other items 
triggers an instantaneous analysis of the spin of a quantum 
particle trapped in the machine. If the spin is in one direction 
it will result in the release of a candy bar, but in the other 
direction it will not. Similarly, sometimes with no insertion of 
any coins, the particle's spin will be measured and a candy 
bar will be ejected. Here, the insertion of a Euro is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to explain the presence of a candy 
bar. We do not have any explicable deterministic way of 
addressing the presence of a candy bar from this machine. 
We could assume that more information is needed, but clear- 
ly even when we have a suspected causal factor, it does not 
always result in the release of a candy bar (hence prediction 
is impossible). In order to fiilly understand the nature of the 
machine we need to address all of its constituent parts and the 
mechanistic effects of all possible causal factors, even if 
some of those may be reliant on fundamentally indetermini- 
stic variables (such as quantum mechanics or human free 
will). 
When dealing with archaeological sites, we are faced with a 
similar circumstance. Correlative models assume that all 
variables are either present and have been measured, or that 
they could be if we only had the information. Ironically, this 
is termed deductive chauvinism, (Salmon 1998:142-163) and 
it implies that given all variables and all parameters, all pro- 
babilities could be determined and prediction would be 100 
% accurate and 100 % precise. Correlative modelers, though, 
do not deny the influence of human behavior and cognition in 
making site placement decisions. Yet, the acceptance of this 
perspective assumes that all human cognition is a determini- 
stic system and implies an absence of free will (Salmon 
1998:28). Thus, correlative models are only capable of iden- 
tiiying necessary factors to produce archaeological sites, and 
only those which are both frequently necessary and com- 
monly observable. Correlative models are not capable of pro- 
viding insight into the sufficiency of site placement factors to 
explain the presence of a site, nor the mechanisms of how site 
selection processes are determined. This is in direct opposi- 
tion to the second purpose of predictive modeling. 
Cognitive models assume, at least, the limitations of the 
second machine, but allow the possibility of the third (where 
some aspects of site placement decisions may be, in principle, 
inexplicable). This assumes that some aspects of human 
systems are dynamical. Dynamical systems do not imply the 
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absence of predictability for all aspects of the system, mere- 
ly that they range on a scale between entirely predictable to 
entirely unpredictable. A correlative analysis, though, is by its 
very nature limited to only those aspects which are highly 
predictable, and cognitive explanation must focus on causal- 
mechanistic issues instead (Salmon 1998). This requires the 
adoption of explanatory frameworks which deal with indeter- 
ministic phenomena. 
So, this brings us to the point at which we might ask; why do 
so many applications of predictive modeling tend to be strict- 
ly correlative? The first reason is probably one of convenien- 
ce. It is relatively easy to take an existing dataset of archaeo- 
logical sites and environmental values, perform some stan- 
dard statistical analyses (such as multiple nonlinear regres- 
sion), and produce a handy formula. The formula can then be 
turned around and applied in a GIS and a fairly accurate and 
precise model sometimes results. Second, correlative models 
are often presumed to have some level of objectivity. With 
respect to predictive models, I think it is often assumed that 
more complex statistics means greater objectivity. Such 
methods have their uses, but the old maxim of "bad data in, 
bad data out" applies regardless of the methods of mathema- 
tical manipulation in between. This was illustrated quite suc- 
cinctly by Cowgill's warnings against placing too much 
emphasis on mathematical models at the expense of theoreti- 
cal profimdity (Cowgill 1986:387). 
But, ultimately, why is it that correlative models seem to 
work, at least on occasion? The main reason a correlative 
model does achieve success is based on what might be called 
the lowest common denominators for site selection. These are 
several variables that correlate highly with archaeological 
sites simply because they are limiting factors on all human 
behavior; primarily slope and distance to water. Invariably, 
every successful correlative predictive model uses slope and 
distance to water, in some form, as key factors in developing 
correlative formulas, and they almost all occur in semi-arid or 
highly dissected areas. Causality, though, has not been 
addressed in such correlative models. It is assumed that 
because of the correlation between known archaeological 
sites and particular variables, that they were actively used as 
suitability indicators for sites. In reality, though, I argue that 
most environmentally correlative variables (especially slope 
and distance to water) act primarily as auto-correlations and 
were probably rarely cognized as variables of choice. In that 
sense, they may be considered necessary factors for site 
selection, but their importance is auto-correlative with all 
human activity not causally conditioned by it. Thus, they 
cannot be seen as sufficient cause for site placement. 
So the upshot of this discussion is; how do correlative models 
fail to meet the goals of predictive modeling? Several things 
would be required for successful application of a correlative 
model. First, the project would need to be located in a region 
that is sufficiently arid and dissected enough that slope and 
distance to water are meaningftil limiting factors, or suitable 
altemative limiting factors can be identified. Second, it 
would require a large dataset of accurate and well described 
archaeological sites from all temporal periods of similar 
fiinction, and which do not cross multiple cultural bounda- 
ries. Third, it would require an additional dataset which could 
be used to test the accuracy and precision of the model, or 
alternately a large enough initial dataset of sites that a "jack- 
knife" sample can be held back and used for testing. Fourth, 
it would require a well developed environmental dataset from 
which measurable variables can be extracted. 
The problem is that there are few locations within which all 
of these criteria are met. Almost invariably the project areas 
do not have such ideal conditions or large and accurate data- 
sets, and those conditions can only be met by vast amounts of 
data gathering at a very high cost. It therefore becomes too 
costly or even impossible to do a correlative predictive model 
in many cases, and ultimately the resulting model does not 
provide better insight into site placement processes than intu- 
ition. As the cost of doing the predictive model increases, the 
reasons it was initiated become increasingly irrelevant from a 
land management perspective. Since slope and distance to 
water are the primary important limiting factors in most cor- 
relative models, they contribute the greatest percentage to a 
model's success. Any variables beyond the primary ones add 
proportionally less to the gain statistic and therefore are of 
smaller and smaller consequence. Conversely, though, the 
means of extracting the influence of those additional varia- 
bles adds increasingly to the cost of the model. 
Ultimately, this begs the question of; how should we create 
and apply quantitative archaeological predictive models? 
What purposes are appropriate, and who should pursue them? 
I argue that we need to recognize that correlative predictive 
models (regardless of their methods and area of application) 
have severe theoretical and explanatory limitations. They can 
be used in some situations to give insight into land manage- 
ment activities; specifically alternatives analysis. But they 
should not be mistaken as tools of interpretative archaeology. 
Likewise, it would be inappropriate to consider correlative 
models as a means to protect significant archaeological sites 
or high potential areas, as they would be limited to only abun- 
dant kinds of sites and a few, probably auto-correlative, envi- 
ronmental factors. Without causality, predictive modeling 
may be a usefiil land management tool in some severely limi- 
ted settings and with nearly unlimited ftmding, but it provides 
no explanatory power and forces a deterministic and facile 
understanding of human cognition. 
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